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The Empire Writes Back 
(to Michael Ignatieff)
Rahul Rao
This article critiques the re-legitimisation of empire evident in recent
writing by Michael Ignatieff. It begins by locating his work within the
larger debate on empire emerging today. Focusing first on Ignatieff’s
more general comments on empire, it suggests that his defensive case
for empire is misleading: it ignores the extent to which the
circumstances allegedly necessitating ‘new’ empire are themselves a
consequence of older empire, and indeed older US empire. Focusing
next on Ignatieff’s largely consequentialist case for the 2003 attack on
Iraq, it argues that the ‘success’ of the imperial project – to the extent that
this requires the cooperation of Iraqis – will depend crucially on the
motives of the imperialists. Without engaging directly with Ignatieff’s
work, the final section addresses some of the questions that the
foregoing critique may have raised. In particular, it examines critically
the claim that empires are legitimised by the public goods they provide.
––––––––––––––––––––––––
There has been a tremendous renewal of interest in ‘empire’ as a concept
relevant to the understanding of contemporary international relations.
This is an entirely welcome development, if only because a term that has
long been an epithet deployed by the left and denied by the right seems
to be regaining the status of an analytical category enabling us to
describe the way power is actually exercised in the world today.
Nevertheless, a worrying aspect of this new scholarship—especially for
a reader from the postcolonial developing world—is the insidious return
of normative defences of empire. This trend is particularly evident in
Michael Ignatieff’s recent musings on empire, which constitute the focus
of this article. I begin by locating Ignatieff’s work in the context of the
larger debate on empire that is emerging today. In the following two
sections I focus, first, on his more general comments on empire and
____________________
Thanks for comments are due to Andrew Hurrell, Henry Shue, James Paul,
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editors and anonymous reviewers of Millennium, for their very helpful
suggestions. Apologies for the somewhat presumptuous title—I can do no better
than to echo Arundhati Roy, in speaking ‘as a [relatively privileged] subject of
the American Empire . . . as a slave who presumes to criticise [his] king’. 
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second, on his justification of the 2003 attack on Iraq as empire-in-action.
I hope to offer a critique that brings to light the myths and blind spots
on which his re-legitimisation of empire depends. In the concluding
section I do not engage directly with Ignatieff’s work, but attempt to
address some of the questions that my own critique may have raised. In
particular, I am keen to address the oft-repeated assertion that empires
are legitimised by the public goods that they provide.
Locating Ignatieff
Although the re-legitimisation of empire has been a long time coming,1
the debate has acquired a new urgency in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Two broad justifications for the ‘return’ of
empire are typically advanced in the recent literature. The first is that
dysfunctional states, by serving as a locus for terrorism, drug trafficking,
‘weapons of mass destruction-related programme activities’ and a host
of other unsavoury endeavours, pose a threat to order and stability the
world over. This gives powerful states no choice but to impose more
decent forms of governance on them, by force if necessary. As Sebastian
Mallaby puts it, ‘the logic of neo-imperialism is too compelling . . . to
resist’ in such circumstances.2 From the point of view of the imperial
power, this is a defensive and self-regarding justification: empire is
justified as being necessary in the security interests of the metropolis.3
The flip side of this argument provides a second justification for empire:
empire is good for the periphery because it brings good governance to
‘rogue’ or ‘failed’ states, thereby ensuring greater respect for the human
rights of their inhabitants. This is an other-regarding justification for
empire, one that many see as being the contemporary variant of the
mission civilisatrice.
Although commentators typically advance a blend of both
justifications,4 variations of emphasis are evident. For Ignatieff, it is the
other-regarding justifications that clinch the argument for the recent
Millennium
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1. See Frank Furedi, The New Ideology of Imperialism: Renewing the Moral
Imperative (Boulder: Pluto Press, 1994).
2. Sebastian Mallaby, ‘The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and
the Case for American Empire’, Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (2002): 6.
3. See also Max Boot, ‘The Case for American Empire’, The Weekly Standard 7,
no. 5 (2001), www.weeklystandard.com.
4. See Robert Kagan, ‘The Benevolent Empire’, Foreign Policy 111 (Summer
1998): 24-35; Richard N. Haass, ‘Imperial America’, paper at the Atlanta
Conference, Puerto Rico (November 11, 2000), http://www.brookings.edu/
dybdocroot/views/articles/haass/2000imperial.htm; Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior
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attack on Iraq (and empire more broadly). In his latest piece (which is,
incidentally, an attempt to seriously qualify many of his earlier Iraq-
specific claims in light of the deteriorating situation in that country), 
he says,   
While I thought the case for preventive war [based on self-
regarding justifications] was strong, it wasn’t decisive. It was
still possible to argue that the threat was not imminent and
that the risks of combat were too great. What tipped me in
favour of taking these risks was the belief that Hussein ran an
especially odious regime and that war offered the only real
chance of overthrowing him.5
I want to focus here on Ignatieff’s other-regarding case for empire. In
doing this, I concur with Eric Hobsbawm’s judgment that the ‘imperialism
of human rights’ advocated by ‘a minority of influential intellectuals,
including Michael Ignatieff in the US’ is ‘more dangerous’ than the self-
interested arguments for empire advanced by the right, because of the
veneer of legitimacy that it gives this project.6 The liberal, human rights-
based case for a revival of empire is powerfully reinforced by the moral
rehabilitation of old empire, for which no one has done more in recent
times than Niall Ferguson. His magnum opus Empire: How Britain Made
the Modern World, makes for fascinating reading, particularly in his listing
of what he takes to be the credit side of British imperial achievement.7
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Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House,
2002), 147; Dinesh D’Souza, ‘In praise of American empire’, The Christian Science
Monitor (April 26, 2002). 
5. Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Way We Live Now: The Year of Living Dangerously’,
The New York Times Magazine (March 14, 2004), www.nytimes.com.
6. Eric Hobsbawm, ‘After the Winning of the War—United States: wider still
and wider ’, Le Monde diplomatique (June 2003), http://mondediplo.com/
2003/06/02hobsbawm. 
7. Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London:
Penguin, 2003), xxv. These are: (i) the triumph of capitalism as the optimal
system of economic organisation; (ii) the Anglicisation of North America and
Australasia; (iii) the internationalisation of the English language; (iv) the
enduring influence of the Protestant version of Christianity; and (v) the survival
of parliamentary institutions. No consideration is given to the fact that ‘the
triumph of capitalism’ often involved resource plunder and the destruction of
local manufacturing capacity, or that the ‘Anglicisation of North America and
Australasia’ were achieved at the cost of genocide of the indigenous inhabitants
of those continents, or that there is nothing self-evidently superior about
Anglicisation, English and Protestantism (at least to the vast majority of
humanity who share few or none of these identities).
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Further reinforcement was provided at a recent conference on ‘failing
states and benevolent empires’, where a leading academic noted with
satisfaction that developing countries had finally stopped blaming
colonialism for all their problems and started taking responsibility for
their own development, or lack thereof.8 When western academics express
impatience at imputations of historical responsibility for colonialism, they
in effect arbitrarily impose a statute of limitation on discussions of old
empire, even as others in the academy—like Ignatieff—open new chapters
in this evolving story. The convergence of this whitewashing of old
imperialism, limitation of its moral responsibility, and advocacy of new
imperialism has fuelled a profoundly disturbing renewal of enthusiasm
for empire in the western academy today.
Nevertheless, even within the western academy the case for empire
has been fiercely contested. A number of commentators have advanced
self-regarding arguments against empire, emphasising the dangers that
the imperial project poses to the metropolis. These range from Chalmers
Johnson’s astonishingly prescient warning of ‘blowback’,9 to traditional
Realist predictions of self-encirclement by counter-balancing coalitions
of hostile powers as well as the possibility of imperial overstretch.10
Johnson also laments the implications of the imperial project for political
culture in the metropolis: enhanced militarism, loss of democracy and
constitutional rights, and an increased role for propaganda.11 Other
voices have drawn attention to the profound ironies inherent in other-
regarding justifications for empire: the claim of empire to bring ‘rule of
law’ when it is itself a violation of law, the challenge of simultaneously
presenting the imperial project as a philanthropic mission (to an
international audience) and as being in the national interest (to a




8. The Boston, Melbourne, Oxford Conversazione 2003, ‘Making States Work:
Failing States and Benevolent Empires’, University of Oxford (September 4-6, 2003).
9. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire
(London: Time Warner, 2002).
10. G. John Ikenberry, ‘America’s Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5
(2002): 44-60; Ivan Eland, ‘The Empire Strikes Out: The “New Imperialism” and
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11. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of
the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). For a combination of the
above arguments see Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and
the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
12. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Empire and Moral Identity’, Ethics and International
Affairs 17, no. 2 (2003): 49-62.
13. Edward Rhodes, ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’, Survival
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Finally, there is a growing body of work that employs the category
‘empire’ in an ostensibly value-neutral sense (although subtle normative
slants are evident), highlighting the different sorts of analytical purchase
that this enables. For Barkawi and Laffey, the concept ‘offers a way out
of the “territorial trap” set by Westphalia and alerts us to a range of
phenomena occluded by IR’s central categories’ (such as the Realist
fiction of an anarchical international system).14 For Michael Cox, it
effectively dispels the myth of US exceptionalism and enables
comparisons between the US and other great powers in history.15 For
Martin Shaw, it forces us to acknowledge the post-imperial character of
the West and the quasi-imperial character of politics in much of the non-
Western world (a useful insight that he then goes on to employ very
problematically, as I later suggest).16 Notwithstanding the analytical
utility of this literature, it has its own blind spots. With the possible
exception of Barkawi and Laffey, these writers are not very interested in
the peripheries of imperial systems and more specifically with how
empire looks from below. Among other things, I attempt to explore the
‘points of impact’ where imperial powers and local collaborators—or
resistors—interact, for it is here that the viability of imperial
arrangements will ultimately be revealed.17
Ignatieff on Empire
It is worth spelling out why Ignatieff’s use of ‘empire’ is more than
simply descriptive or analytical. His book Empire Lite begins with an
introductory caveat seeking to characterise the project as value-neutral
description (‘I am not interested in using the world imperial as an epithet.
I would prefer to use it as a description and to explore how American
imperial power is actually exercised’.18). Nevertheless, prescription is
frequently smuggled in: ‘nobody likes empires, but there are some
problems for which there are only imperial solutions’;19 and elsewhere—
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45, no. 1 (2003): 131-154. For a critique of both self- and other-regarding
arguments for empire see Jedediah Purdy, ‘Liberal Empire: Assessing the
Arguments’, Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 2 (2003): 35-47.
14. Tarak Barkawi & Mark Laffey, ‘Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2002): 109.
15. Michael Cox, ‘The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation
—Again’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 32, no. 1 (2003): 23.
16. Martin Shaw, ‘Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the
Global Era’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31, no. 2 (2002): 327-336.
17. Stephen Howe, ‘American Empire: the history and future of an idea’,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-6-27-1279.jsp#
18. Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite (London: Vintage, 2003), 3.
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‘imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes
politically incorrect’.20 Indeed ‘the key question’, as he sees it, ‘is whether
empire lite is heavy enough to get the job done’.21
The framing of this question is noteworthy, particularly for the way
it leaves undisturbed the assumption that ‘empire’ is the way ‘to get the
job done’. All that remains to quibble over is how coercive it needs to be
in order to do so. ‘The job’, as Ignatieff goes on to explain, involves
dealing with the threats and insecurities generated by ‘failed’, ‘failing’ or
‘rogue’ states.22 ‘Nations sometimes fail, and when they do only outside
help – imperial power – can get them back on their feet’.23 Note also how,
for Ignatieff, ‘imperial power’ seems to be the only form that ‘outside
help’ can take. Perhaps we should not be surprised at the essential
synonymity of these ideas from the perspective of the rulers, but
Ignatieff also claims to speak for the ruled: thus, ‘Afghans . . .
understand the difficult truth that their best hope for freedom lies in a
temporary experience of imperial rule’.24 (For a sense of how little
divides, in practice and rhetoric, self-regarding from other-regarding
justification or conservative from liberal, one has only to listen to Max
Boot: ‘Afghanistan and other troubled lands cry out for the sort of
enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident
Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets’.25) Troubled lands in the
postcolonial world have been crying out for many forms of ‘outside
help’26—fairer terms of trade, technology transfer, debt forgiveness, more
aid, to provide just a sample – but one is hard pressed to find voices that







22. Ignatieff does not distinguish very clearly between these quite distinct
phenomena. It is now commonly accepted that failed states are characterised by
a collapse of governmental authority and a resulting state of anarchy (e.g.
Somalia in 1991-92). In ‘rogue’ states there is usually a functioning government,
which is perceived as behaving aggressively in its external relations with other
states and/or abusing the human rights of its citizens internally. There is a
possible (but by no means inevitable) overlap between the two, and it seems
reasonable to suppose that they demand distinct policy approaches.  
23. Ignatieff, Empire Lite, 106.
24. Ibid., 107.
25. Boot, ‘The Case for American Empire’.
26. For an excellent survey of these demands and the reactions they elicited at
a time when they were given possibly their most institutionalised expression, see
Robert W. Cox, ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic Order:
reflections on some recent literature’, International Organisation 33, no. 2 (1979):
257-302.
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Closer attention to the causes of state failure reveals that many of these
had their roots in an older era of empire. The risks of state failure are
greatest in those former colonial possessions in which the processes of
state-and nation-building have not sufficiently advanced. Mohammed
Ayoob reminds us that most developing countries have had to telescope
these dual tasks into a combined and drastically shortened process,
without the luxury of time and agency that western European states
have enjoyed. Further, they have had to do so under extremely difficult
conditions: having inherited arbitrary boundaries and ethnically
heterogeneous populations from their imperial predecessors, they suffer
from a lack of internal cohesiveness and state legitimacy. This has
condemned many of them to a postcolonial lifetime of civil war and
secessionist strife—usually precursors to complete state failure.27
The egregious exploits of the corrupt, venal elites that rule many of
these states are frequently cited as justification for the revival of empire.
Yet only by looking at the more critical-historical scholarship of
Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett do we get a sense of the extent to
which these elites are themselves creatures of older ‘benevolent’
empire.28 Wendt and Barnett explain how colonial patterns of skewed
economic development resulted in a situation of disarticulation or
dualism, whereby colonial economies tended to spawn a modern sector
(usually closely integrated with the metropolitan and world economies)
in addition to the existing traditional sector. Colonial governments came
to rely heavily on native elites associated with the modern sector for the
purposes of maintaining order and extracting revenue from the colony.
This arrangement benefited native elites materially, and in doing so
bound them closely to the metropolitan state while breaking down their
ties to the mass of the native population. In most cases, decolonisation
merely handed over the reins of power to local elites, who then
consolidated their internal security position vis-à-vis the ‘threat’ posed
by the masses by continuing to rely on external economic and political
ties. In the situation of ‘informal empire’29 that characterised the Cold
War, these ties took the form of ‘security assistance’ provided by the
superpowers to Third World elites in return for their cooperation in the
pursuit of Cold War objectives. The illegitimate regimes inherited from
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27. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1995). 
28. Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, ‘Dependent State formation and
Third World militarisation’, Review of International Studies 19, no. 4 (1993): 321-347. 
29. Wendt and Barnett define informal empire as a socially structured system
of interaction among juridically sovereign states in which one, the ‘dominant’
state, has a significant degree of de facto political authority over the security
policies of another ‘subordinate’ state.
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colonialism therefore reproduced themselves, with external patronage
continuing to obviate the need for native elites to obtain the consent of
the governed or to arrive at the sort of labour-capital compromises that
characterise western welfare states.
To locate the roots of contemporary state failure in earlier eras of
European and US empire is not to engage in some self-congratulatory
blame game. Nor should it provide any measure of comfort to Third
World elites, who, as the preceding account suggests, have proved only
too willing to collude with metropolitan elites in their self-interest.
Rather it is to affirm, in the words of Edward Said, ‘the interdependence
of various histories on one another, and the necessary interaction of
contemporary societies with one another’,30 with a view to avoiding a
repetition of the injustices of the past. To be fair, Ignatieff alludes to the
idea of failing states as legacies of em-pires past, but the connections are
left exceedingly vague and ill-defined:
Being an imperial power . . . means carrying out imperial
functions in places America has inherited from the failed
empires of the 20th century. . . . America has inherited this crisis
of self-determination from the empires of the past. . . . America
has inherited a world scarred not just by the failures of
empires past but also by the failure of nationalist movements
to create and secure free states.31
More problematically, Ignatieff sees the failures of past empires and
nationalist movements not as reason to adopt fundamentally new
approaches to the resulting problems, but rather to revive the notion of
imperial rule. This view is tantamount to arguing that crises of state
failure are a result, not of too much imperialism, but too little. 
This nostalgic view of empire is surprisingly widely held. Robert
Jackson, for example, argues that hasty and premature decolonisation
was more detrimental to the well-being of Third World states than the
colonial encounter itself.32 Contrasting the different developmental
trajectories of the ‘white’ dominions and colonies in the British empire,
Ferguson says: ‘That [the British empire] didn’t deliver Canadian-style
growth rates in India isn’t explicable in terms of ruthless British
exploitation. It’s explicable in that there wasn’t quite enough
Millennium
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30. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), 43.
31. Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Burden’, The New York Times Magazine (January 5,
2003): 24, 53, 54.
32. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the
Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 198-202. 
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imperialism: the British didn’t do quite enough to achieve that kind of
growth’.33 (But wasn’t ‘doing enough’ in Canada and the other dominions
premised on ruthless exploitation of the indigenous inhabitants?) The
‘not enough imperialism’ thesis is argued forcefully by Max Boot in his
discussion of US intervention in Hispaniola: ‘The marines had tried hard
to plant constitutional government but found that it would not take root
in the inhospitable soil of Hispaniola. The only thing that could have kept
a Trujillo or Duvalier from seizing power was renewed US intervention.
. . .[T]he only thing more unsavoury than US intervention, it turned out,
was US non-intervention’.34 And elsewhere in a discussion of Nicaragua,
‘dictatorship [in Nicaragua] was indigenous; democracy was a foreign
transplant that did not take, in part because America would not stick
around long enough to cultivate it’.35
Thus, economic, political and military crises in the postcolonial
Third World have begun to serve as a retrospective justification for
imperialism. There is a virtual consensus among the above writers that
the roots of these crises are to be found, not in the colonial, but in the
nationalist era. (In saying ‘both’, Ignatieff is usefully ambiguous on this
point.) But as Frank Furedi argues, this is the contested question and we
cannot begin by assuming we know the answers.36 In this context,
Jedediah Purdy usefully reminds us that ‘the failure of many postcolonial
regimes does not in itself mean that the preceding colonial rule was a
good thing, whose passing was to be regretted. Nor, more pertinently,
does such failure indicate that independence was inherently unviable for
those countries. While those countries faced severe disadvantages apart
from the Cold War, we will never know whether some might have done
much better free of the proxy battles of those decades’.37
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33. Niall Ferguson, ‘Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order
and Lessons for Global Power ’, Carnegie Council Books for Breakfast
(September 16, 2003), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/
prmID/1033. 
34. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American
Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 181. Contrast this with John F. Kennedy’s
own admission: ‘There are three possibilities, in descending order of preference:
a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro
regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we cant really renounce the second until we
are sure we can avoid the third’.  Cited in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ‘The United
States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History’, in Exporting
Democracy: The United States and Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 388.
35. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 251.
36. Furedi, The New Ideology of Imperialism, 100, 106.
37. Purdy, ‘Liberal Empire’, 39. For a contrary view arguing that colonialism
was preferable to the situation of ‘quasi-statehood’ in which many postcolonial
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Paying attention to those proxy battles reminds us of how deeply the US
(together with the former USSR) is implicated in the production of
‘rogue’ and ‘failed’ states—something we are likely to forget reading
Ignatieff.38 In his work, the US is presented as the ‘reluctant republic’ that
has had imperial responsibility thrust upon it. The myth of reluctance
allows the imperialist project to present itself as a primarily defensive
enterprise. By obscuring or discounting the material motives driving
new empire, the notion that the US has asserted itself only under
extreme duress and then always for the noblest purposes has become the
master narrative explaining and justifying the US’ exercise of global
power.39 In this vein, Ignatieff frequently reiterates the theme of
inheritance, as if the US—arguably the single most powerful actor in the
international system since the end of the First World War—has exercised
no agency in bringing about the state of affairs in which it now finds
itself. In his latest article, Ignatieff has—to his credit—explicitly
acknowledged that ‘like Osama bin Laden, whom the US bankrolled
through the 1980s, [Saddam] Hussein was a monster partly of America’s
making’.40 One wonders, first, why these vital admissions have been so
late in coming (these are not new facts that have emerged after the 2003
attack on Iraq); and second, why—if previously known—they did
nothing to change his mind. Surely, to recognise that the imperial power
itself bears significant responsibility for producing the circumstances
that now occasion its intervention is to suggest that new empire is
something of a protection racket.41
Finally, it is worth interrogating the central assumption running through
Ignatieff’s work: namely, that empire can put failing states back on their feet
Millennium
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states found themselves upon decolonisation, see Jackson, Quasi-States, 146-
151.
38. Wendt and Barnett describe how illegitimate governance structures created
by colonialism and imperialism endured during the Cold War because the
superpowers found it convenient to exploit them for the pursuit of their global
objectives. See Wendt and Barnett, ‘Dependent State formation and Third World
militarisation’.  For an account of how the Cold War frustrated challenges to the
legacies of empire throughout the world also see Mark N. Katz, ‘The Legacy of
Empire in International Relations’, Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): 365-383.
39. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S.
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 8, 87. 
40. Ignatieff, ‘The Way We Live Now’; For a brief account of the CIA role in
bringing the Ba’ath party to power in Iraq and the subsequent US arming of
Saddam Hussein, see Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire, 223-224.
41. For an account of the state as protection racket, see V. Spike Peterson,
‘Security and Sovereign States: What is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?’,
in Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1992), 49-54.
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by assisting in nation-building. Perhaps what he really means is state-
building.42 Empires have certainly shown themselves to be capable of
building states where there were none before, but can they build nations? To
be sure, the vast majority of postcolonial nationalisms today owe their
existence in some measure, however indirectly, to empire. The
crystallisation of an Indian national identity, for example, was greatly
facilitated by the establishment of a subcontinent-wide network of
communication facilities (particularly railways and telegraph), the
introduction of an elite link language (English) and the infusion of new
concepts into political discourse, thanks to the initiation of western
education. In this sense, empire may be said to have provided the hardware
of nationalism. But the software of nationalism—a shared sense of
grievance and resistance to the imperialist invaders as well as the historical
and cultural resources that provided an endless stream of hoary, nationalist
myths—developed in opposition to, or independently of, empire.43 Empire
provided the foil against which nationalisms and nations were constructed.
So while Ignatieff may be right to think that empire has a role to play in
nation-building, this role may evolve—as it has done before—in ways that
ultimately prove deeply subversive of the imperialist project.  
If empires cannot impart a sense of national identity, except in the
indirect and inadvertent way described above, perhaps they have a role
to play in ‘democracy promotion’—an endeavour in which the US has
been engaged for decades, with less than encouraging results.44 While
there are many examples of democratic regimes originating from an act
of external imposition,45 successful democracy promotion ‘assumes the
prior existence of a well-defined nation-state in which no major
problems of national identity remain pending’.46 This factor might
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42. For a classic instance of this sort of confusion, see Ignatieff, Empire Lite, 79:
‘Terror can’t be controlled unless order is built in the anarchic zones where
terrorists find shelter. In Afghanistan, this means nation-building, creating a
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43. For a piercing analysis of the tendency in much of the British literature on
empire to minimise the role of anti-imperialist protest in the process of
decolonisation and/or to portray nationalism as entirely a conscious creation of
empire, see Furedi, The New Ideology of Imperialism, 10.
44. See the extremely sobering conclusions of Lowenthal, ‘The United States
and Latin American Democracy’, 383: ‘Recurrent efforts by the government of
the United States to promote democracy in Latin America have rarely been
successful, and then only in a narrow range of circumstances’.
45. Laurence Whitehead, ‘Three International Dimensions of Democratisation’,
in The International Dimensions of Democratisation, ed. Laurence Whitehead
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8-15.
46. Laurence Whitehead, ‘The Imposition of Democracy’, in Exporting Democracy:
The United States and Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: The
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explain both the triumph of US efforts in Germany and Japan following
the Second World War, as well as the essential irrelevance of those
precedents to the current situation in the Middle East. As Anatol Lieven
points out, with the exception of Iran, none of the states in this region ‘is
a truly national one, and their sense of real common national purpose is
weak. Where state nationalism does exist, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and US support for Israel mean it is hard to mobilise it on the side of the
west’.47 To answer Ignatieff’s initial question, then: if democracy
promotion is unlikely to be successful without a pre-existing sense of
national identity, and if empire can do little to precipitate such an
identity (except in a thoroughly antagonistic way), it is difficult to see
how empire—however heavy—can accomplish the task of putting
failing states back on their feet. 
Ignatieff on Iraq
In the debate on the 2003 war on Iraq, some liberal proponents of empire
jumped onto a fundamentally neo-conservative bandwagon. That there
are differences of agenda between these two groups is hardly a secret.
Ignatieff himself is candid about the lack of humanitarian motivation
among the neo-con warmongers, despite their frequent use of liberal
rhetoric to justify the war: ‘The Iraq intervention was the work of
conservative radicals, who believed that the status quo in the Middle
East was untenable—for strategic reasons, security reasons and
economic reasons. They wanted intervention to bring about a revolution
in American power in the entire region’.48 Of late, he has been even more
explicit on this point: ‘I knew that the administration did not see freeing
Iraq from tyranny as anything but a secondary objective’; and elsewhere,
‘supporting the war meant supporting an administration whose motives
I did not fully trust for the sake of consequences I believed in’.49
Notwithstanding his recognition of the wide gulf separating neo-
conservative motivations from his own, Ignatieff seems to believe in the
eventual reconcilability of these very different objectives. Writing with
evident approval of the neo-con master plan, he says that the new pillar
of US interests in the Middle East would be ‘a democratic Iraq, at peace
with Israel, Turkey and Iran, harbouring no terrorists, pumping oil for
the world economy at the right price and abjuring any nasty designs on
Millennium
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its neighbours’.50 There is not even the barest acknowledgement of
potential contradictions in this deep and intrusive agenda: far from
pumping oil for the world economy at the ‘right’ price, a democratic Iraq
might very well decide that it needed to extract maximum revenue from
its natural resources, or that it ought to strongly support Palestinian self-
determination.51 The historical record suggests that US democracy
promotion efforts have often floundered precisely on this unwarranted
assumption that all ‘good’ things (free markets, free peoples) go
together. Where democracy promotion has clashed with the imperatives
of stability, containment, or a climate conducive to powerful business
interests, democracy has almost always been given short shrift.52
Nevertheless, the insistence on the absolute harmony of all good
things in much US public rhetoric is by no means accidental or careless:
it is vital to the justification of the entire project. To the extent that
material interests figure at all in publicly offered justifications for new
empire, policy makers typically insist that US interests and US ideals are
congruent, that US ideals in turn are universal ideals,53 and therefore,
that there is an almost perfect correspondence between US interests and
universal ideals. These inarticulate premises allow US National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice to proclaim: ‘America’s pursuit of the
national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets
and peace . . . the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when
the international balance of power favours those who believe in them. .
. . America’s military power must be secure because the US is the only
guarantor of global peace and stability’.54 Ignatieff does nothing to
interrogate these clichés of US foreign policy. Instead he plays along by
grafting his human rights agenda on to what he knows to be the less
altruistic game plan of the current US administration. 
The Empire writes back (to Michael Ignatieff)
____________________
50. Ignatieff, ‘Why Are We In Iraq?’, 71.
51. Or it might conclude that recent decrees passed by the US-UK Coalition
Provisional Authority, permitting foreigners to own up to 100% of all sectors
except natural resources and imposing a flat tax rate of 15%, are not conducive
to the imperatives of reconstruction and development. See Naomi Klein, ‘Bring
Halliburton Home’, The Nation (November 6, 2003).
52. Whitehead, ‘The Imposition of Democracy’, 358; Steven W. Hook,
‘Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad’, in Exporting Democracy:
Rhetoric vs. Reality, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2002), 121-123.
53. For a devastating critique of this tendency, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’
Crisis 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1949), 87.
54. Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs 79, 
no. 1 (2000): 47, 49, 50.
158
Ignatieff advises liberals to support the war on Iraq because he sees it as
‘bound to improve the human rights of Iraqis’.55 Any misgivings we
might have about neo-conservative motivations for intervention are
assuaged with the argument that such concerns seem to value good
intentions more than good consequences.56 This attempt to justify the
intervention through a strictly consequentialist lens is untenable. For
one thing, Ignatieff recognises the need to acknowledge the anti-
imperialist norms of the postwar era. Towards this end, he is keen to
distinguish the new US empire from the empires of old—but in doing so,
he can only point to good intentions: ‘The twenty-first century imperium
is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a
global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and
democracy’.57 By Ignatieff’s own admission, vital elements of these
‘grace notes’ are missing in the neo-con decision-making calculus—so
how different really is new empire from old?
Further, the success of the intervention (from both neo-con and
liberal perspectives) seems to rest crucially on good intentions.58 One
important insight of Ferguson’s Empire is that without the collaboration
of indigenous elites, Britain would not have had the human or financial
resources to ‘rule’ a quarter of the world’s population.59 US empire has
learnt this lesson well and also depends significantly on the cooperation
and assistance of native elites.60 There will never be a shortage of
opportunistic collaborators (native elites whose motivation for
collaboration derives primarily from the personal material gains on
offer, rather than any sense of mission or duty to resuscitate their failing
states). But opportunistic collaborators are Frankenstein’s monsters:
they have precipitated precisely those problems that new empire has
been called upon to deal with. Max Boot seems unconcerned by this
possibility, writing: ‘Once we have deposed Saddam, we can impose an
American-led, international regency in Baghdad, to go along with the
one in Kabul. With American seriousness and credibility thus restored,
we will enjoy fruitful cooperation from the region’s many opportunists,
who will show a newfound eagerness to be helpful in our larger task of
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rolling up the international terror network that threatens us’.61 Boot’s
vision reads like a recipe for more blowback. Even from a self-regarding
perspective it should be obvious that opportunistic collaborators are
notoriously unreliable, their cooperation ebbing and flowing in
proportion to the patronage they receive. From an other-regarding
perspective, opportunistic collaborators are hardly likely to run the sorts
of governments that respect the human rights of their peoples. Thus,
opportunistic collaborators are unlikely to facilitate the success of the
intervention (except in the very short-term), whether ‘success’ is defined
as security for the metropolis or the periphery.
What sorts of collaborators new empire needs and attracts will
depend crucially on the motives of the new imperialists. If the neo-
imperialist project is animated even partly by a desire to bring human
rights and democracy to dangerous and unstable peripheral zones, it
will need principled native collaborators—individuals whose primary
allegiance is to securing good governance for their peoples. ‘Principled
collaboration’ may sound like a contradiction in terms, but it captures
better than anything else the dilemma in which native elites62 with any
commitment to good governance are likely to find themselves.
‘Collaboration’ has the loathsome connotation of ‘traitorous cooperation
with the enemy’, but it can also be used in the value-neutral sense of
participation in a joint endeavour.63 What connotation it carries depends
very much on the agenda of the (more powerful) external actor with
whom one is called upon to collaborate—in other words, on the
intentions and motives of the intervener. The legitimacy of native elites
in the eyes of their people will in turn be determined by the nature of
collaboration (mutually beneficial partnership or traitorous
cooperation?) that they are perceived to be engaging in. 
It is only within such a framework that we can understand such
unexpected events as the decision of Siham Hattab not to stand in council
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elections in Baghdad. As an educated young woman from a conservative
Shia family, a lecturer in English literature by profession, representing
one of the most deprived districts of Baghdad, this ‘rising star of Iraqi
politics’ is potentially a model collaborator in every sense of the word (or
at least from the perspective of the Coalition Provisional Authority). Yet
her reluctance to declare her candidature in a high-profile election stems
from a fundamental ambivalence over the ethics of cooperation with the
CPA.64 Principled collaborators are unlikely to step forward (or to enjoy
any legitimacy, if they do) if the US intervention is perceived to be
primarily about consolidating its dominance in the region. (This, as
Ignatieff informs us, is principally what the neo-cons had in mind.)
Indeed, I would go so far as to say that in this post-imperial age in which
‘there are far too many politicised people on earth today for any nation
readily to accept the finality of America’s historical mission to lead the
world’,65 principled collaborators are unlikely to step forward at all, if
they perceive that what they are collaborating with is empire.66
The Immorality of Empire
Even shorn of its exploitative and racist historical baggage, ‘empire’ as a
form of political organisation remains deeply objectionable because it is
premised on the complete denial of agency of those ruled without
representation. This normative objection applies to all exercises of
imperial power wherever they occur—not merely to modern European
‘saltwater’ empires. In this context, Martin Shaw is right to draw our
attention to the ‘quasi-imperial’ character of political relations in much
of the non-Western world.67 Even in a democratic polity such as India, to
the extent that the state is engaged in repressing legitimate self-
determination struggles or in a civilising mission vis-à-vis its tribal
population for example, the imperial quality of political life is palpable.68
Shaw is much less convincing when he goes on to argue, first, that the
West has become post-imperial, and second, that ‘the reassertion of post-
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imperial Western power . . . has been in turn a response to crises in the
quasi-imperial states of the non-West’.69 Again, we are presented with
the image of the West as benign, public-spirited fire-fighter, rushing to
the rescue of victims in messy, quasi-imperial non-Western states.   
This imagery is odd because most of the changes that Shaw
describes in the way Western power is exercised, suggest that it has
become post-imperial—if at all—in its intra-bloc relations (i.e. within the
developed capitalist world comprising the US, Europe and East Asia). It
is here that elements of hierarchy have been mitigated, not least by
greater economic parity, but also through more extensive and
meaningful consultation and partnership in such fora as the G8, NATO,
etc. But while the West may have become post-imperial in its internal
relations, its frequent assertions of power in the non-Western world
cannot be considered post-imperial unless we adopt the unwarranted
assumption that such intervention occurs purely for altruistic reasons
and always at the behest of the putative beneficiaries. If Western
intervention in the non-Western world continues to be imperial, then
Shaw’s suggestion that this is a justifiable response to crises in the quasi-
imperial states of the non-West is deeply problematic. As I have argued
above, many of these crises (arbitrary boundaries and self-determination
struggles, exploitive class structures and tyrannical elites) are a
hangover from older periods of empire. To argue that they can only be
dealt with by a renewed exercise of Western imperial power, risks
perpetuating a vicious cycle.  
The normative objection to empire as a form of rule without
representation applies even if, as many have argued, empires supply
public goods.70 From the perspective of the smaller actors in the system,
even in a best-case scenario where genuine public goods were provided
free of charge, the provision of goods that the hegemon would have
produced anyway (because it is in its private interest to do so) whether or
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not these smaller actors existed, essentially renders those actors
irrelevant. It carries all the offensive paternalistic connotations of being
treated as a ward of the state, lacking in mental (or physical) capacity,
and therefore being told what is ‘good for you’ with no meaningful
autonomy or participation in your own governance.71 But perhaps this
argument is unappealing to those not of a liberal persuasion. So let us
suppose for the sake of argument that empire would not be morally
problematic if it provided genuine public goods. In that case, the
relevant question becomes whether this (US) empire at this point in time
is providing the public goods that it claims to. There has been a great
deal of careless piggybacking on hegemonic stability theory (HST) in
recent work on empire,72 without more careful consideration of Duncan
Snidal’s warning that ‘the range of the theory is limited to very special
conditions’ and that ‘while some international issue-areas may possibly
meet these conditions, they do so far less frequently than the wide
application of the theory might suggest’.73 Although a rigorous analysis
of this problem is beyond the scope of this article, I want to outline
briefly the contours of a possible counter-response to the public goods
argument.
If security is allegedly the principal public good supplied by the US
empire,74 the first question to ask is whether security is a public good.
Public goods are defined as non-excludable (it is impossible to prevent
non-contributors from enjoying the good) and joint (a number of actors
are able simultaneously to consume the same produced unit of the good
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without detracting from each other’s enjoyment). While some idealised
version of ‘world peace’ might satisfy this definition, security as
currently envisaged by the US does not. First, security is not non-
excludable—as Snidal points out, alliances and defence pacts are
premised on providing peace and security benefits to some but not
others;75 Bruce Russett argues that even for ‘peace’ by dominance, one
can choose boundaries to the areas one pacifies, excluding strategically
insignificant or uncooperative governments from one’s defensive or
deterrent umbrella.76 The US National Security Strategy speaks of
‘prevent[ing] our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends
with WMD’.77 Further, the concept of the ‘security dilemma’ suggests
that making some secure requires rendering others insecure, thereby
undermining the ‘jointness’ of security. As many have emphasised, this
is true even of (apparently) wholly defensive measures such as Ballistic
Missile Defence78 (which is precisely why they have evoked such a
hostile reaction from China and others). If the criteria of non-
excludability and joint-ness are not satisfied, then security cannot be
considered a public good.79
Second, if the means by which the US provides security rouse
hostility and resentment in much of the non-Western world and invite
retaliation on a worldwide scale—against not only the US itself but also
its friends, allies, collaborators and anyone in the way—then there are
very sound reasons for doubting whether US-imposed ‘security’ is a
public good. Johnson writes that ‘world politics in the twenty-first century
will in all likelihood be driven primarily by blowback from the second
half of the twentieth century—that is, from the unintended [foreseeable?]
consequences of the Cold War and the crucial American decision to
maintain a Cold War posture in a post-Cold War world’.80 To this might
be added the obvious codicil that world politics for a long time to come
will be driven by blowback from the US-led ‘war on terror’. If this is true,
then the US may be said to be producing public ‘bads’ both for itself and
others. One way of reconciling my scepticism of ‘public-ness’ with my
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scepticism of ‘good-ness’ is to suggest that while the goods (if any) of US
security-imposition are privatised, the bads are well and truly shared (or
worse, externalised). This is another way of telling the story of the Cold
War: pacification in the core and proxy war in the periphery.
Third, proponents of HST argue that the theory is legitimised by
the implicit quid pro quo on which it rests: in return for foregoing
representation in decisions concerning what public goods are to be
produced and how, lesser actors are able to free-ride (i.e. consume public
goods without paying for them). When asked why a rational hegemon
would permit free-riding, it is argued that the very nature of the goods
supplied (i.e. their non-excludability and joint-ness) makes it impossible
for the hegemon to tax their use. But having seen that the goods are often
private, or only imperfectly public at best, HST’s built-in assumption of
benevolence turns out to be unwarranted or exaggerated. Further, unless
hegemony is defined purely in absolute and not at all in relative terms,
the hegemon is likely to be much more powerful than other actors in the
system. Even if the goods supplied are perfectly public, this opens up
the possibility that the hegemon will extract payment through cross-
linkage of issue-areas (i.e. I cannot extract payment for perfectly public
good X, but if you do not pay nevertheless, I will withhold imperfectly
public good Y). Thus, regardless of whether the hegemon is able to
enforce exclusion, it may be capable of coercing others into paying for
the goods.81 As a rational actor seeking to further its own self-interest, the
hegemon can be expected to use every available means to extract
payment for the goods it provides.82 If public goods are not free, as the
more benevolent variants of HST suggest, then this is a case of taxation
without representation—an injustice even most Americans ought to be
able to empathise with. 
Fourth, even in the case of genuine public goods that are provided
free of charge, it is by no means self-evident that free-riding works to the
detriment of the hegemon. A number of writers have commented on the
extent to which the hegemon actively welcomes and seeks to perpetuate
the situation of free-riding, as a means of exacerbating the dependence
of its allies and enhancing its leverage vis-à-vis them.83 Hegemonic
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stability theorists are therefore misleading when they characterise free-
riding as an unqualified benefit to lesser actors. Given the role that free-
riding plays in providing a moral prop for the theory, a view that
underscores the ambiguity of the gains from free-riding for smaller
actors makes the entire edifice of HST look morally suspect.
Whatever the merits of the imperial imposition of public goods, we
ought not to be precluded from enquiring into whether this is the best or
only means of providing such goods (i.e. empire may be a sufficient
condition for the provision of public goods, but is it a necessary one?).
Disturbingly, by proclaiming its intention to dissuade anyone from
‘surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States’, the US NSS
does just this.84 By seeking to perpetuate the dominance of the US and
the massive power deficit that already exists between itself and the rest
of the world, the NSS effectively slams the door shut on any discussion
of more equitable means of providing global public goods such as
security. A great deal more needs to be said to demonstrate the moral
bankruptcy of theories advocating the imperial provision of public
goods. At the very least, I hope to have cast reasonable doubt on the oft-
repeated assertion that this empire is legitimised by the public goods that
it provides, of which global security is said to be the foremost. 
To conclude, writing about events that are unfolding
contemporaneously invites the risk of being overtaken by developments
on the ground and proved disastrously wrong. Nevertheless, I believe
my critique of empire will remain unaffected by the vicissitudes of US
political fortunes in Iraq, because it points to the essential immorality
and impracticality of empire in a post-imperial age. Ignatieff has not
demonstrated that empire, however heavy, can accomplish the task of
nation-building. His defensive case for empire is specious because it
overlooks the extent to which the circumstances of state-failure that
allegedly justify new empire are themselves a consequence of older
empire, and indeed older US empire. His (earlier) strictly
consequentialist attempt to justify the 2003 Iraq war is blind to the fact
that ‘success’ depends crucially on the cooperation of Iraqis—
cooperation that is unlikely to be forthcoming if they are suspicious of
US intentions. His (current) acceptance of the importance of intentions is
welcome, but does nothing to address concerns about the likelihood and
nature of local collaboration. Whether one describes what is going on in
the world today as ‘empire’ or uses the more technocratic euphemism
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‘hegemony’,85 consent of the governed seems to be vital to the success of
the project. Part of what it means to live in a post-imperial age is that the
abhorrence of empire is too visceral—too deep a part of political
consciousness, at least in the Third World—for that consent to be freely
given. If the US experiment in Iraq is to be successful, it will have to be
so different from the empires of old as not to look like—more
importantly, not to be—empire anymore.
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